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Abstract 
This paper contains evidence submitted on the DTI green paper 'High Performance 
Workplaces:  The Role of Employee Involvement in a Modern Economy: A Discussion 
Paper'.  This follows on the EU Directive establishing a General Framework for Informing 
and Consulting Employees.  The comments proceed as follows.  The first section places the  
development of representative systems in Britain in a broad historical perspective, arguing 
that there have been a number of missed opportunities in the past in this area.  The second 
section then maps the current situation - it deals with what British workers obtain by way of 
representation in general and information and consultation in particular.  This is compared 
broadly in the third section with arrangements in three other major countries, the US, 
Germany, and France, where we suggest there are important lessons to be learnt.  The fourth 
then deals with what British workers say they want.  In the fifth section, we speculate about 
various scenarios and likely future developments.  In the final section, answers are provided 
to some of the specific questions posed in the consultative document. 
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Introduction 
 
Our evidence is presented in three parts.  Section 1 of this paper gives our summary responses to 
the questions on which comments are invited in the discussion paper.  Section 2, the longest, 
contains the arguments which underpin these answers.  We look in turn at the historical 
background in the UK, the current pattern of representation and lessons to be learned from other 
countries.  We then turn to the available evidence on employee’s demands for consultation, 
concluding with an assessment of some likely consequences of implementation of the Directive.  
An Appendix to the paper contains a number of detailed comments on the current text of the 
discussion paper. 
 
 
1. Responses to Questions 
 
We have responded to six of the eight questions posed.  Question four is directed at those 
responsible for information and consultation within undertakings.  We have nothing specific to 
say about question eight, concerning small firms which fall outside the scope of the Directive 
 
· What do you see as important contributors to high performance workplaces? 
 
There is a voluminous literature linking human resource practices to workplace performance.  
However, we were surprised to find this the opening question in a discussion paper on the 
Directive.  If one’s objective were to maximise workplace performance one would not 
necessarily begin with a discussion of the consultative rights of employees, so to do the reverse 
is at least curious.  There is no unequivocal link between levels of or improvements in 
information to or consultation with employees and performance at the firm or establishment 
level.   
A feature of the current draft is that there is occasional confusion between managerially-
initiated techniques of employee involvement directly intended to boost performance and the 
representative structures for employees required by the Directive.  A danger here is that 
legislation directed at performance enhancement rather than information and consultation might 
not satisfy the requirements of the Directive. 
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· What do you think employees want from their place of work? 
 
Our evidence shows that employees overwhelmingly want voice – influence over their place of 
work - and that they identify this with a combination of measures in which consultative 
opportunities hold a position of importance.  This leads us to conclude that the implementation 
of the Directive will be welcome to many employees 
 
· What benefits do you see in employees being informed and consulted about 
their company or organisation? 
 
We see benefits to employees in a greater sense of involvement and knowledge of their 
workplace, perhaps leading to a reduction in uncertainty.  The benefits to firms will arise 
primarily where adoption of the Directive’s requirements is part of a broader approach to 
employee voice. 
 
· What issues do you think employees should be informed and consulted 
about? How and when do you think this should happen? 
 
We address the premise of the question.  One legislative approach is to specify events which 
trigger consultation and information.  This is uncomfortably close to the “one size fits all” 
approach rejected in the text of the draft.  Another approach is to design a process of consultation 
and information sharing which, while perhaps specifying a minimum set of triggers, allows 
managers and employee representatives to drive their agreed agenda. 
A key issue is the level at which consultation and information sharing occur.  Some issues 
are workplace-specific.  Some affect many establishments in large companies.  In both cases, it 
is essential that enough time be allowed for employee representatives to assimilate information 
and respond, but these time scales may differ.  We stress the need for multi- level information 
disclosure and consultation within large enterprises, with perhaps different issues and time scales 
at different levels.  Perhaps where one focuses on information disclosure and consultation 
primarily as a performance enhancing technique, one tends to ignore the importance of higher 
level consultation. 
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· Do you have any experience of information and consultation arrangements 
overseas that you think might be relevant to the UK? 
 
We have presented such information for France, Germany and USA in the body of the text.  The 
European examples, we believe, show two things.  First, implementation of the Directive is 
compatible with high productivity.  Second, there is a need to map implementation onto the 
strengths of the pre-existing institutional framework for employee representation and 
involvement.  We think the prime lesson to be drawn from the USA is one for trade unions who 
would shun information-seeking and consultation in their preference for bargaining; this 
preference has not led to organising success in USA. 
 
· What should be the key features of domestic legislation to implement the 
Information and Consultation Directive? 
 
We identify two principles.  First, the need for adaptation to institutional structures which in the 
UK we interpret primarily as framing legislation to provide as much scope as is compatible with 
the requirements of the Directive for employers and employees to drive the development of their 
own information and consultation processes.  Second, integration; we see the implementation of 
the Directive as an opportunity to “clean up” and integrate the current UK legal requirements to 
inform and consult particularly in terms of processes and penalties for failure.  Integration would 
have two benefits.  First, it would alleviate any burdens of compliance on firms by rationalising 
existing requirements.  Second, it would provide greater clarity to employees and their 
representatives about rights at work. 
 
 
2. Argument 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This evidence focuses on the mechanisms by which workers, unionized and non-unionized, are 
represented at work and through which they obtain varying degrees of voice in employer 
decision-making.  It highlights the mechanisms of information sharing, joint consultation, and 
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collective bargaining.  An understanding of the interaction of these representative mechanisms is 
important for an appreciation of the present and likely future patterns of worker representation in 
the UK.  Specifically, we suggest that forms of mixed forms of representation may in future 
prove more popular voice mechanisms – with both employers and employees – than they have in 
the past. 
Forms of representation may be viewed in a number of ways.  A basic perspective sees 
systems in terms of direct and indirect representation: the former occurs where the individual 
worker or group of workers is directly involved in decision-making, often around work tasks; the 
latter occurs where there is some sort of body through which employees express voice through 
representatives.  Indirect forms of representation (the main focus of this evidence) may include 
collective bargaining through a union negotiating body or joint consultation through works 
committees or both.  In these cases, representation can be exclusive or inclusive: in the former 
case, the representative body acts only on behalf of certain employees, for example union 
members; in the latter case, the representative body acts for all employees.  Another perspective 
sees systems of representation as rungs on a ladder: the first rung is where a worker might be 
represented by a fellow worker on an individual matter; the second rung is where there is 
provision of information and consultation for employee representatives covering a group of 
workers or the whole workforce; the third rung is where workers are represented by a trade union 
which bargains on their behalf (Ewing 1990: 212; McCarthy 2000).  A similar perspective sees 
representation in terms of a rising hierarchy of forms, from information (where workers are 
informed by their managers), to consultation (where there is an exchange of views, albeit with 
management ultimately deciding), and to negotiation (where there is a measure of contestation 
and joint decision making).  The latter two perspectives imply both discrete representative 
categories and a hierarchy of their importance.  We argue that both are increasingly questionable. 
Further conceptual considerations need to be stated.  Representation may exist on different 
types of issues, ranging from those which affect workers’ immediate jobs (task-based) to those 
that are broader and more business related (policy-based).  Moreover, representation may be seen 
as either events-driven or process-driven.  Where it is events-driven, it is triggered by a specific, 
usually employer- initiated, event, such as a reorganization of work or a plant closure; where it is 
process-driven, representation is part of an on-going process in which the representative body is 
more likely to be permanent and to have an agenda which is pro-active.  There may be single or 
multiple channels of representation.  Finally, of course, systems may be voluntary or statutory.  
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In the latter two cases, the question arises whether these processes are likely to complement or 
conflict with one another.   
The focus of our comments is  on workers and their representation, largely concentrating on 
the private sector.  The data are drawn from various sources, in particular from the Workplace 
Industrial Relations and Employment Relations Surveys (WIRS 1980, 1984, and 1990 and 
WERS 1998) and the British Workplace Representation and Participation Survey (BWRPS), as 
designed by staff at the Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) (Diamond and Freeman, 2001). 
The comments proceed as follows.  The first section places the development of 
representative systems in Britain in a broad historical perspective, arguing that there have been a 
number of missed opportunities in this area.  The second section then maps the current situation - 
it deals with what British workers obtain by way of representation in general and information 
and consultation in particular.  This is compared broadly in the third section with arrangements 
in three other major countries, the US, Germany, and France, where we suggest there are 
important lessons to be learnt.  The fourth then deals with what British workers say they want.  
In the fifth section, we speculate about various scenarios and likely future developments.   
 
2.2  Historical background and missed opportunities 
 
Historically, employers unilaterally made most decisions on work matters.  In some instances, 
usually on job-related issues, skilled or strategically placed workers could unilaterally regulate 
certain aspects of their working lives.  In stages, from the late nineteenth century onwards, 
collective bargaining developed.  In some situations, to ward off collective bargaining, a 
minority of employers established joint consultative arrangements of various kinds (Gospel, 
1992:  79-84, 99).  However, unions were opposed to, or at least suspicious of, consultative 
committees which they considered likely to undermine their appeal to workers and their ability 
to represent members. 
During the First World War, both collective bargaining and joint consultation developed 
significantly at national and workplace levels.  The Whitley Committee recommended that both 
should be further elaborated, with the former concentrated on pay and conditions, in particular 
outside the firm, and with the latter on other matters, especially at the workplace (Whitley, 
1918).  At the time, strong unions showed little interest in consultation; weaker unions accepted 
the proposals on multi-employer bargaining but again showed little interest in joint consultation 
without collective bargaining.  Equally, most employers were reluctant to accept workplace level 
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representation either by shop stewards or other worker representatives.  It was in Germany, at the 
time, in part drawing on British ideas, that a system of combined collective bargaining and joint 
consultation was introduced by legislation (Feldman, 1992).  During the interwar depression, in 
Britain, collective bargaining narrowed and formal joint consultation contracted.  Subsequently, 
both expanded for a second time, from the mid 1930s onwards and during the Second World 
War, with government support (Milner, 1995:  79-87).  However, at the end of the war, again 
neither employers nor unions were sufficiently committed to sustain the joint production 
committees which had been established (Hinton, 1994). 
In the thirty years after the war, unions saw their membership and power grow and demanded 
collective bargaining in preference to joint consultation.  This contrasted with the situation in 
continental Europe where statutorily-based employee consultation was firmly established in 
Germany, France, and other countries and operated alongside collective negotiations.  In the late 
1960s, the Donovan Royal Commission advocated exclusively collective bargaining for Britain.  
‘Collective bargaining is the most effective means of giving workers the right to representation 
in decisions affecting their working lives’.  Approvingly, it quoted McCarthy as saying 
consultative committees ‘cannot survive the development of effective shopfloor organization: 
either they must change their character and become essentially negotiating committees… or they 
will be boycotted by shop stewards and fall into disuse’ (Donovan, 1968:  27, 54; McCarthy, 
1967:  33).  When, a decade later, the Bullock Royal Commission reported on industrial 
democracy, it recommended union-based representation on company boards alongside collective 
bargaining.  Bullock briefly mentioned, only to dismiss, German works councils (even though 
they arguably were a more important part of the German system than board level representation 
[Bullock, 1977: 42-43, 48, 126] ).  Union support for ‘free’ collective bargaining, hostility to 
joint consultation, and opposition to non-union channels of representation prevailed. 
A number of conclusions may be drawn from this broad historical survey.  First, the paradox 
of the voluntaristic system of ‘free’ collective bargaining was that it relied heavily on a 
framework of legal immunities and state support.  It provided neither much of a ceiling on union 
aspirations, in favourable times, nor much of a floor in unfavourable ones.  Second, in 
Wedderburn’s terms, collective bargaining and joint consultation grew up in an interrelated and 
complex ‘double helix’ type relationship (Wedderburn, 1997:  30).  At times, they 
complemented each other; at other times, the one subsumed the other.  Third, in retrospect, 
unions and employers missed a number of opportunities to build a system of employee 
representation based on interlocking collective bargaining and joint consultation.  In the case of 
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the unions, in the early 1970s, they missed the opportunity to secure positive legal rights when 
they were strong.  When, from the late 1970s onwards, the legal framework for the voluntaristic 
system eroded, the coverage of collective bargaining quickly shrank.   
From the 1970s, a number of factors shaped representation in Britain.  First, legal 
intervention steadily increased.  Some of this was initially auxiliary to collective bargaining, 
such as the provisions for union recognition and for information disclosure introduced in the 
early 1970s.  Some mandated forms of representation on specific issues, such as health and 
safety and, consequent on EU membership, collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings.  
These procedures initially gave legal priority to union representatives, but, in their absence, 
allowed for non-union representation (Gospel and Lockwood, 1999).  Second, the political and 
legal context which favoured unions changed with the election of the Thatcher government in 
1979.  Through subsequent years, immunities were removed and restrictions were placed on 
unions and their collective bargaining activities.  Third, union membership and the coverage of 
collective bargaining began to shrink.  Undoubtedly this was in part the result of an increasingly 
hostile legal and political environment (Freeman and Pelletier, 1990).  Fourth, from the 1980s 
onwards, employers increasingly looked to alternative voice mechanisms, based in part on 
indirect representation via joint consultation, but based more on direct communication and 
participation via direct workforce meetings, briefing groups, and problem-solving circles (Forth 
and Millward, 2002:  3-7).  In these circumstances, unions faced a dilemma about acceptance of 
new forms of consultation established by employers or introduced under EU directives.  Slowly 
and unevenly, they began to reconcile themselves to events-driven and multi-channel 
representation (TUC, 1995).  However, union conversion is still not complete. 
The election of a Labour government in 1997 led to the re-introduction of law on union 
recognition and the reformulation of law deriving from European directives on representation in 
collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings.  In the latter areas, priority in the choice of 
representatives is now vested in a descending order of first union stewards, followed by 
representatives of standing consultative committees, and last by representatives chosen ad hoc 
for the specific purpose.  In the case of multinational corporations, the government also 
implemented the European Works Councils Directive.  This set two precedents.  First, it 
established legally-based, standing, general consultative arrangements in Britain, albeit for a 
particular group of employees - those in transnational firms.  Second, it treated representation as 
inclusive rather than exclusive, giving priority in the choice of representatives to the entire 
workforce and not to union members.  Finally, from late 2001, the government has accepted the 
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EU Directive on Information and Consultation rights in national level undertakings.  Thus, in 
terms of the law and practice, Britain has moved decisively down a multi-channel road, but has 
been left with a fragmented system of information, consultation, and representation (Gospel, 
Lockwood and Willman, 2003). 
 
2.3  The present context of representation, information, and consultation at work 
 
In this section, we use successive WIRS surveys for two purposes: first, to look at the state of 
employee representation in 1998, the date of the last survey; second, to assess patterns of change 
over the period from 1980 to 1998.  Overall, we identify a story of reduction in coverage of 
indirect representation.  However, the pattern of change is complex.   
We turn first to the pattern in 1998.  In that year unions were recognized in 42 per cent of all 
workplaces, with a presence, i.e. membership but no recognition, in 11 per cent.  In other words 
around half of all workplaces had no union presence.  In the private sector, unions were 
recognized in only 24 per cent of workplaces.  Within the private-sector, the highest proportions 
of workplaces with union recognition were in recently privatized industries, such as utilities, 
transport, and communications.  Both organizational and workplace size are positively associated 
with union recognition (Cully et al., 1999:  92). 
However, recognition is not representation.  In 1998, 22 per cent of workplaces had union 
representatives, 10 per cent had non-union representatives, and 5 per cent had both.  In the 
private sector, these figures were 15, 10, and 2 per cent respectively.  On the whole, non-union 
representatives were slightly more likely to be found in workplaces where there was a union 
presence but no recognition than in any other situation.  Also, where they were found, there was 
a slightly higher number of non-union rather than union representatives per workplace (a mean 
number of 4.7 as opposed to 3.7) (Cully et al.:  1999, 96).  Of course, overall it should be kept in 
mind that a majority of workplaces had no representatives of any kind. 
In 1998, the coverage of joint consultative committees was not very different from that of 
collective bargaining in that 29 per cent of all workplaces had a workplace- level consultative 
committee.  In the private sector, this figure was 26 per cent of all workplaces.  However, in both 
cases, a slightly lower percentage had a functioning committee, i.e.  one which met at least three 
times a year (23 and 20 per cent respectively).  But the counterpart of this is that there is a 
decline in the scope of collective bargaining (Millward et al., 2000:  138-183).  Consultative 
committees can exist at various levels.  Thus, in the private sector, 16 per cent of workplaces had 
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a committee at workplace level and 18 per cent at a higher level, but only 8 per cent had both.  
Size effects here are complicated.  Workplace size is positively associated with the existence of a 
workplace committee, but negatively associated with the use only of a higher level committee.  
Organizational size is negatively associated with workplace committees, but positively 
associated with higher level committees or a combination of the two (Cully et al., 1999:  99; 
Millward et al., 2000:  109).   
Union recognition and consultative committees appear to be associated, in each size band.  
Thus, overall, 38 per cent of workplaces with a recognized union had a committee, compared to 
20 per cent of those where there was no union presence.  In the private sector, these figures are 
32 and 20 per cent respectively.  On the basis of this, Cully et al., (1999: 100) conclude that 
‘union representation and indirect employee participation go hand in hand rather than being 
substitutes’.  However, they also suggest that, in non-recognized workplaces where there is 
union presence, consultative arrangements do not appear to be a springboard for recognition 
(Cully et al., 1999:  101). 
Overall, the scope of joint regulation by any methods is modest.  Table 1, which is for both 
private and public sectors, shows the balance of negotiation, consultation, and information 
sharing by issue in the minority of workplaces where there is on-site representation.  In 
workplaces where there are union representatives, bargaining is clearly dominated by pay and to 
a lesser extent by grievance handling.  In these workplaces, aside from these two matters, 
consultation and information sharing is the dominant joint process.  The largest category overall 
is no joint regulation.  In workplaces where there are non-union representatives and no union 
recognition, information and consultation are the dominant processes, but a surprising amount of 
negotiation is reported on health and safety and on pay and conditions.  Again unilateral 
management regulation is a large category, but less so in workplaces where there are union 
representatives.  The average number of issues over which negotiation occurred was similar at 
1.1 for union representatives and 0.9 for non-union representatives.  The average number of 
issues on which consultation occurred was 2.9 for union representatives and 3.7 for non-union 
representatives.  Generally, the topics which score highest in terms of some sort of joint 
regulation are health and safety and grievance handling, both of course underpinned by statutory 
requirements (Cully et al., 1999:  104-5).   
In the private sector at least, the main form of workplace communication and participation is 
of the direct kind.  Thus, 35 per cent of workplaces have problem-solving groups, 35 per cent 
regular workplace meetings, and 43 per cent team briefing groups.  Taking these three practices 
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(problem solving groups, workforce meetings, briefing groups), 75 per cent of all workplaces 
and 72 per cent of private-sector workplaces had one or more of these; the average workplace 
had 1.2 and the average private-sector workplace had 1.1 (Cully et al., 1999:  64-69 and 
WERS98). 
Turning to change in indirect representation over time, the main points to draw from Table 2 
and from the survey of all the WIRS surveys (Millward et al., 2000) are as follows.  First, there 
is a major decline in union density and presence, in particular in the private-sector, where also 
recognition halves across the period.  The proportion of workplaces where collective bargaining 
was the dominant form of pay determination fell overall from 60 to 29 per cent between 1984 
and 1998.  In private manufacturing it fell from 50 to 23 per cent and in private services from 36 
to 14 per cent.   
Second, the pattern of change in consultation is different.  Overall, the decline is less marked 
than for the union-related variables.  It is true that the relative proportion of workplaces with 
non-functioning consultative committees grows, but, as stated, there was also a ‘hollowing out’ 
of collective bargaining institutions.  The overall and private-sector trends on consultation 
coverage are not as divergent as those on union variables; in fact, it will be noted that there is a 
rise in private-sector consultation coverage between 1990 and 1998.  Third, the percentage of 
private sector workplaces with a union representative fell from 41 to 17 per cent between 1980 
and 1998, whereas those with a non-union representative (where no union representative) 
increased from 21 to 50 per cent.  Both where there is union recognition and presence, the 
incidence of union representatives has fallen, especially in the latter case.  Non-union 
representative numbers have risen in all cases.  However, overall, fewer workplaces have any 
form of employee representative in 1998 because the decline in union representation has not 
been fully offset by the increase in non-union representation (Millward et al., 2000:  115).   
Third, we observe the growth of direct voice arrangements.  Thus, regular meetings between 
senior managers and the workforce, problem-solving groups, and briefing groups increased 
significantly in the private sector.  Between 1984 and 1998, the proportion of workplaces where 
there was union-only voice fell from 24 to 9 per cent; the proportion where there was both 
indirect voice (union and non-union) and direct voice fell from 45 to 39; but those where 
managers relied solely on direct arrangements rose from 11 to 30 per cent (Millward et al., 2000:  
127).  In the case of briefing groups, in 1998, the increase was confined to workplaces without a 
union and those without a consultative committee.  In the case of regular meetings and problem-
solving groups, these were more common where there was union representation and where there 
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was joint consultation.  Overall, according to Millward et al. (2002: 22-3), direct communication 
practices do not seem to have been used to supplant indirect representation via trade unions, but 
there is some weak evidence that they may be used to exclude unions.   
Finally, on the survival rate of arrangements, 85 per cent of private sector workplaces 
recognizing unions in 1990 still had them in 1998.  By contrast, the proportion of functioning 
committees to survive over the period was 63 per cent.  The figure was a little lower for 
workplace-wide meetings (58 per cent), problem-solving groups (56 per cent), and briefing 
groups (42 per cent).  Overall, therefore, despite its decline, union voice would seem to be more 
durable than non-union; but, of course, it has also been less likely to be established in new 
workplaces.  A key point to close on is that the majority of establishments enduringly prefers 
voice to no voice.  Willman et al., (2002) show that the proportion of all establishments covered 
by WIRS and choosing voice remains stable over time.  In 1984, 84 per cent of establishments 
had some form of employee voice.  Although the voice mechanisms changed, 82 per cent  of 
establishments in 1998 continued to have voice mechanisms 
 
2.4  International comparisons  
 
As part of the analysis of present and possible future UK patterns, it is useful to examine briefly 
forms of representation in three other major countries, the US, Germany, and France, chosen for 
lessons they may have for Britain.  As the discussion paper notes, all have, on various measures, 
higher productivity than UK. 
The US provides a useful comparison, given a common inheritance of a reliance on 
collective bargaining as the key form of employee voice.  Historically, US unions sought joint 
regulation with employers through collective bargaining, though with limited success.  On the 
other hand, a leading set of large employers established employer-dominated unions and non-
union representative committees (Jacoby, 1985:  187-189; Jacoby, 1997:  20-34).  With the New 
Deal, the 1935 Wagner Act outlawed the latter arrangements, and, to the present date, indirect 
representation without unions risks illegality.  As a result, employers have been constrained in 
operating consultative committees which are not union-based.  Unions have sought exclusively 
to bargain and have not pushed for voluntary consultative committees or councils.  The outcome 
is that collective bargaining coverage has shrunk, indirect forms of worker participation have not 
developed, while direct forms of employee involvement have grown. 
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Under the Clinton administration, the unions hoped to achieve changes in the legal 
framework that governs recognition for collective bargaining.  Some of the research for the 
resulting Dunlop Commission touched on the possible desire on the part of US workers for joint 
consultative arrangements; however, proposals for legislative changes focused on the framework 
of recognition and collective bargaining law.  As a counter, a group of employers promoted the 
so-called Team Bill which would have promoted direct forms of participation.  Neither set of 
proposals was passed into law.  Thus, US unions remain dependent on organising for collective 
bargaining.  Union density in the US has fallen to 9 per cent of the private-sector labour force 
and on one prediction could fall to 3 per cent by 2010 (Freeman, 1995:  533).   
Germany has provided a significant contrast with the UK for practioners and students of 
industrial relations.  Unlike Britain, Germany went down the road of multi-channel 
representation - collective bargaining outside the firm, alongside legally-based joint consultation 
at the workplace and company levels, and representation on the supervisory board of companies.  
Our analysis of information disclosure and consultation in Germany (Gospel and Willman, 2002) 
shows German unions have benefited from their relationship with works councils and vice versa.  
Works councillors tend to be union members, the union provides advice to the council, and this 
in turn gives the union influence.  In law and practice, employees through their works councils 
receive more information and experience more consultation than their British counterparts.  
However, in recent years, works councils have in some instances superseded unions, with more 
being discussed through the consultation process and with more deviations from nationally 
bargained agreements.  For unions, this has presented the challenge and opportunity of 
developing new coordinating and servicing roles (Turner, 1991; Thelen, 1991; Mitbestimmung 
Kommission, 1998; Frick and Lehmann, 2001).   
The German story is therefore usually seen as positive for union representation where, on the 
whole, joint consultation and collective bargaining have complemented one another.  From 1980 
to 1999, union membership has fallen from around 38 in West Germany to 29 per cent for the 
whole of Germany; the coverage and scope of collective bargaining and joint consultation 
remain high, though with some shift towards decentralized dealings with works councils. 
By contrast, the French story may be seen as a more negative one for unions.  Historically, 
France also went down the road of multi-channel representation, with legally-based joint 
consultation alongside collective bargaining.  Periodically, French governments have intervened 
in industrial relations to support consultative arrangements.  Since 1945, the law has mandated 
the election of a comité d’enterprise.  As further amended by the Auroux legislation in the early 
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1980s, the purpose of the comité d’enterprise is to ensure expression of the views of employees 
and to allow their interests to be taken into account in decisions.  French employers are legally 
obliged to inform and consult employees over a wide range of matters (Gospel and Willman, 
2002). 
However, periodically French governments have needed to intervene to reinforce the system.  
In part, the more limited success of the French system is because comité d’enterprise have less 
extensive rights and are more employer- led than German works councils.  In larger part, it is 
because French unions are more fragmented, have less presence at the workplace, and 
consequently have been less able to use the law and institutions.  Union membership has fallen 
from 18 per cent to 9 per cent over the last ten years and the scope of collective bargaining at 
workplace level is narrow.  One might draw the following conclusions.  On the one hand, there is 
evidence that joint consultation and collective bargaining have not complemented one another in 
France and the former has often come to substitute for the latter.  On the other hand, French 
workers would undoubtedly obtain less in the absence of the comité d’enterprise and arguably 
French unions have been able to maintain a foothold in many firms largely because of the role 
they play in these arrangements (Howell, 1992:  100-102). 
National systems are of course deeply embedded in national histories and cannot be easily 
replicated.  So, are there any lessons for British unions in these different national patterns?  We 
would argue as follows.  If British unions follow those in the US, they may become ghettoized 
within the ever-shrinking perimeter of collective bargaining.  On the other hand, there is a 
possibility that they could take advantage of works council-type arrangements, as in Germany.  
However, the French case shows this is no automatic route to success if they are unable to take 
advantage of such arrangements.  Drawing on Germany and France, an obvious question is 
whether European-style representational arrangements can be successfully transferred to the UK.  
We have seen that there have been changes in UK practice towards mixed systems; joint 
consultation is of some interest to employers and of increasing interest to unions.  A key question 
is: would British workers be interested in a move towards joint consultative arrangement and 
mixed systems of representation on European lines?  We address this in the next section. 
 
2.5  What do British workers want? 
 
There are substantial difficulties involved in ascertaining what representation workers want.  
Workers may say they want one thing in everyday circumstances, but may want something else 
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in more exceptional circumstances when confronted with a major change in contractual 
arrangements or when there are major redundancies.  Here we draw on the BWRPS survey, 
which is more likely to reflect what workers want on an everyday basis. 
As is often the case in such surveys, a majority of British workers report reasonably high 
levels of satisfaction in their jobs and of commitment to their employing organization.  However, 
they are often critical of management - more so than suggested in a comparable US survey 
(Freeman and Rogers, 1999) and a majority desire more say in decisions about work tasks, pay 
levels, and organisational governance.  In total, 38 per cent identify current problems with unfair 
and arbitrary treatment in areas such as rewards and discipline and report favouritism and 
bullying.  Despite this, 50 per cent of all workers reported that they do not go to anyone for help 
with work difficulties.  This fairly high flow of problems in British workplaces is confirmed by 
the rapid increase in recent years in enquiries to the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service and Citizens Advice Bureaus and cases to Industrial Tribunals.   
There would also appear to be a related representation gap.  Table 3 suggests that most 
workers would prefer to deal with problems collectively rather than individually.  The only area 
where there is a clear preference for individual remedies is promotion.  However, in most cases 
the preference is for dealing with issues via a group of fellow workers rather than a trade union 
or staff association representative.  Perhaps not surprisingly, union members show a stronger 
preference for collective solutions and prefer union representation rather than working through a 
group of fellow workers.  The exceptions are again on matters of promotion and training, where 
union members would look more to a group of fellow workers.  Non-union employees prefer 
fellow workers to unions as the method of collective action on all issues.  It is notable that 
workers in situations where there is a recognized union and where there is both a union presence 
and a consultative committee would seem to have the highest preference for collective solutions. 
Table 4 explores this further showing that a majority (72 per cent) of employees think their 
workplaces would be better with some form of collective representation.  This breaks down as 92 
per cent of union members and 61 per cent of non-union members.  However, in the case of 
union members, it is striking that only 11 per cent favour a union on its own, whereas 74 per cent 
favour both a union and  a joint consultative committee/works council.  Non-members wishes are 
more dispersed: 34 per cent want no form of representation, 29 per cent favour a joint 
consultative committee on its own, 27 per cent favour a joint consultative committee and a trade 
union, but only 5 per cent favour a union on its own.  Workers in situations where there is 
already a union and a consultative committee are the most in favour of dual-channel 
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representation (72 per cent), but it is also striking that workers in situations where there is a 
recognized union or a union presence are also well disposed to dual representation.  There is 
little preference for a consultative committee on its own, except where this already exists.  All 
this suggests that many union and non-union members see the various institutions as potentially 
complementary.   
Moreover, the survey shows that 82 per cent of workers would be in favour of legislation 
which required management to meet with employee representatives.  Overall, union members are 
more favourably inclined to statutory works councils than non-members (89 as opposed to 77 per 
cent).  However, the belief in legislation is strongest (92 per cent) where there are already dual 
channels.  In addition, there is a strong feeling that works councils should be elected by workers 
(72 per cent), have legal protections from possible discrimination by employers (75 per cent), 
and meet on a regular basis and not just at management discretion (89 per cent).  But, the 
proportions favouring confidential information for employee representatives is relatively low (40 
per cent in the case of union members and 33 per cent in the case of non-members).   
Joint representation by a trade union and a consultative committee / works council would 
seem to have some pay-off in terms of satisfaction with information disclosure.  Table 5 suggests 
that most workers feel very or quite well informed, with lowest levels of satisfaction about future 
employment and staffing plans.  There is no clear difference between union and non-union 
members, except the former have an advantage in knowing what other people doing their job 
were earning, reflecting the union role in wage bargaining.  Generally, workers in a situation 
where there was only a consultative committee / works council felt the best informed.  This was 
followed closely by situations where there was both a consultative committee / works council 
and a trade union.  Workers felt least well informed where there were no representative 
arrangements, but close to this were situations where there was exclusively a trade union.  There 
are various reasons why union members may feel they receive less information – they may have 
higher aspirations which are unmet; management may feel more constrained to give information; 
and union representative may not pass on information to members.  However, it is significant 
that, where there is both a union and a consultative committee / works council, there is a high 
level of satisfaction with information disclosure.   
In summary, there is a demand for more indirect representation and voice among British 
workers.  However, both among non-members and members, there is not a strong demand for 
union voice alone.  Consultative committees / works councils, especially legally-based, are 
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clearly very attractive to both non-members and members and are viewed as complementary to 
trade unions. 
 
2.6  ‘A New Era in Employment Relations’?  
 
Finally, we turn to what representation British workers are likely to get.  On union recognition, 
the present legal procedures will have a small direct effect and a somewhat larger indirect effect.  
However, the overall impact will be limited.  On union membership, over the last few years, 
there has been some increase in numbers, but no increase in density, and it will be an up-hill 
struggle for unions to maintain or increase momentum in recruitment.  Even if recognition and 
density were to stabilize or increase, there seems little likelihood that the decline in the coverage 
of collective bargaining will be reversed in the short term, especially in the private-sector, where 
employers’ and employees’ preferences are for forms of representation and participation other 
than collective bargaining (Millward et al., 2000:  197-199).  By contrast, on recent trends, direct 
forms of information sharing and employee participation are likely to continue to increase.   
So, what of indirect representation via joint consultation and its intersection with collective 
bargaining?  Here, the recent passage of the EU Directive on Information and Consultation 
(2002/14/EC) is likely to play an important part in shaping future developments. 
The Directive will affect large enterprises (over 150 employees) by early 2005 and 
eventually cover all undertakings with more than 50 employees by 2008.  This means it will 
cover three quarters of the UK labour force.  Undoubtedly, the Directive will start to have an 
immediate impact as management and unions plan for its implementation.  In the Directive, 
consultation is defined as an ‘exchange of views and the establishment of dialogue’ (Article 2) - 
implying an ongoing process.  Article 4 (2) outlines the substantive areas: (a) there is an 
obligation to provide information on the general business situation of the undertaking; (b) there 
is an obligation to inform and consult on the likely development of employment and on 
‘anticipatory measures’ which might threaten employment; and (c) there is an enhanced 
obligation to inform and consult on decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work 
organization or in contractual relations.  These are minimum mandatory topics but other topics 
are permitted to be covered.  Consultation must take place at an ‘appropriate’ time and so as to 
enable employee representatives to study the information and to prepare for consultation.  It shall 
also be ‘at the relevant level of management and representation depending on the subject under 
discussion’ - implying that there should be different levels of representation and consultation 
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within an undertaking.  On item (c), the consultation shall be ‘with a view to reaching an 
agreement’ (Article 4) - implying an ongoing process of give-and-take.  In all cases, 
management is obliged to provide a reasoned response to representatives’ opinions.  
Representatives are also to be given adequate ‘protection and guarantees’ to enable them to 
perform their duties (Article 7).  On matters of confidentiality, the employer may withhold 
information which it considers would seriously damage the undertaking, and representatives and 
‘any experts who assist them’ may be made subject to an obligation of confidentiality.  Sanctions 
for failure to comply shall be ‘effective, proportionate, and dissuasive’ (Article 8).  Employers 
and employee representatives may negotiate different arrangements before and after 
transposition - but these would have to respect the principles of the Directive (Article 5). 
The transposition of the Directive into UK law will depend on political circumstances, and 
the debate will be along a spectrum of what Wedderburn has described as ‘soft’ and ‘strong’ 
rights (Wedderburn, 1997:  34).  However, some outcomes are reasonably certain.  For example, 
forms of direct participation will not qualify.  Equally, ad hoc and issue-specific arrangements 
will not qualify - given that the Directive talks about a ‘permanent’ and ‘general’ system of 
consultation (Article 10).  Many existing systems of consultation will not qualify - such as where 
representatives are appointed by management.  Trade union collective bargaining will qualify -  
subject to non-members not being disenfranchised.  Moreover, from the wording, it seems likely 
that arrangements will have to be created at multiple levels within enterprises.  At the time of 
writing, other outcomes are more problematic.  The following are particularly unclear.  How, in 
the absence of an employer initiative, will a request for a council or committee be instigated?  
Will there be a process of balloting?  Who will be deemed to be representatives and how will 
such persons emerge?  What will be the exact nature of sanctions?  Whatever the legislation, as 
with all EU-derived law, the transposition will be subject to interpretation by the European Court 
of Justice which in the past, in areas such as representation, sex discrimination, and working 
time, has rendered Directives far-reaching.  The implementation of the directive will seemingly 
depend on the preferences of employees and on the capabilities and actions of employers and 
unions.   
On the basis of the foregoing, what can we speculate about this?  On the part of employers, 
their advantage lies in the fact that for some time they have controlled employee relations and in 
many cases have introduced more sophisticated human resource policies.  On the other hand, in 
addition to the new law, there are other constraints.  Employees would seem to want more 
representative voice at work, and employers now confront more confident unions than they have 
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for many years.  Undoubtedly, some employers will seek to avoid new arrangements, arguing 
either that they already have adequate mechanisms or that their employees do not want 
arrangements on these lines.  This strategy clearly has dangers in that it may be challenged by 
unions, in all or in parts of an enterprise.  For other employers, there is an opportunity to 
establish arrangements, either wholly or partially new, either with or without trade unions.   
Union fears must be that employers may use the Directive to exclude or eject them and that 
they have neither the leverage nor the capability to mobilize workers to achieve and operate new 
information and consultation arrangements.  However, there is evidence that employees desire 
more voice at work, many workplaces have a union presence which can be built on, and unions 
now have legal supports which they can potentially turn to their advantage.  At one end of the 
spectrum, where unions already have a high level of membership and bargaining coverage, they 
may eschew new arrangements, but use the law to capitalize on what they already have and 
expand the scope and level of consultation and bargaining.  At the other end of the spectrum, 
where unions have no presence, they will have little choice for employees but to accept what 
employers may put into place.  Here unions will have mixed motivations as to whether they wish 
to see such arrangements succeed.  Where arrangements are successful, this may mean 
permanent union exclusion; where they are less successful, this may mean new opportunities to 
intervene.  It is in situations at the middle of the spectrum, where there is hollow recognition or a 
partia l presence, at some levels or in some parts of an undertaking, that unions will confront 
challenges and have real opportunities to increase their membership and activities. 
To conclude, the UK has a differentiated system of worker representation, where dir ect voice 
has been on the increase, indirect voice through joint consultation has held up, and voice through 
trade unions has shrunk considerably.  In terms of indirect mechanisms, in both law and practice, 
the UK has already moved down the road of multi-channel representation and is likely to move 
further in this direction in future.  British workers clearly want more voice, but with a preference 
for joint consultative arrangements and based on multi-channel representation.  The present 
situation presents a set of major challenges and opportunities for the industrial relations parties.  
In the light of the Directive, the opportunity for government is to establish for the first time in the 
UK a permanent and effective general system of information and consultation at work.  Some 
employers may see this as an opportunity to create weak voice mechanisms; for others, there is 
an opportunity to establish strong arrangements which may complement one another.  The 
challenge for unions is to be able to build on these arrangements and to maintain and expand 
their role within them. 
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Appendix  
 
Detailed comments on the discussion paper considerations and questions. 
 
 
Below there follows a detailed set of comments on the discussion paper and on the 
considerations and questions posed therein.  We take the paper section by section. 
 
 
Executive summary 
 
Para 1.  ‘It will not be imposed on workplaces; it will give those workforces who want it the 
right to information and consultation’.  Giving the right implies that there will be some 
mechanism, such as balloting, whereby a workforce will be able to actualise the right to establish 
machinery. 
 
Para 3.  ‘Successful’ workplaces.  In our analysis of WERS, we do not find much effect of 
information sharing alone on performance, with the exception of an effect on quality of goods 
and services.  Information sharing may only work when other voice mechanisms are supportive. 
 
Para 4.  The reference to ‘team briefings and quality circles’.  There are various references 
throughout which in places imply that that these direct forms of participation may qualify as 
mechanisms for information and consultation under the Directive.  Our reading of the Directive 
is that, if challenged, they would not qualify, because they would not pass tests of independence, 
representativeness, and permanency. 
 
Para 5.  We strongly agree with the conclusion that the Listing Rules are not an obstacle to 
disclosure and consultation with employee representatives. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Para 1.2.  List of fair standards so far introduced.  Why not list the national minimum wage 
which would seem to be relevant here and might be seen as an enabling basis for effective 
participation at work. 
 
Para 1.3.  Is it 72 or 75 per cent? 
 
Para 1.4.  See comment above about the small independent effect on information sharing alone.  
Disclosure may only work where there are strong voice institutions to support it. 
 
Para 1.8.  Information and consultation may not be an extension of collective bargaining, but 
arguably effective consultation may be a form of joint decision-making. 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
Para 2.12.  Reference to ‘team briefings, workplace-wide meetings…’  As stated above, this 
implies that that these direct forms of participation may qualify as mechanisms for information 
and consultation under the Directive.  Our reading of the Directive is that, if challenged, they 
would not qualify. 
 
Para 2.14.  ‘More than 50 per cent of workplaces operate some sort of joint consultative 
committee’.  Our reading of WERS98 is as follows.  In the survey year, 29 per cent of all 
workplaces had a workplace-level consultative committee.  In the private sector, this was 26 per 
cent of all workplaces.  However, in both cases, a slightly lower percentage had a functioning 
committee, i.e.  one which met at least three times a year (23 and 20 per cent respectively).  
Consultative committees can of course exist at various levels.  Thus, in the private sector, 16 per 
cent of workplaces had a committee at workplace level, 18 per cent at a higher level, but only 8 
per cent had both (Cully et al., 1999:  99; Millward et al., 2000:  109).  See 2 (d). 
 
Para 2.14.  The reference to committees ‘appointed’ by management.  Of course, such 
committees would not qualify under the Directive if challenged.  See above. 
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Para 2.14.  The discussion of pay may be higher in situations where consultation exists alone, in 
the absence of collective bargaining. 
 
Para 2.17.  Indeed the incidence of joint committees are related to union presence.  They would 
also seem to be related to various forms of direct participation and employee involvement.  
Arguably the causal link runs from representative to direct participation.  Much academic 
research suggests that the latter is more likely to survive and be effective where indirect 
representation via unions or joint consultation is strong. 
 
You might wish around here to say something about the durability of institutions.  85 per cent of 
private sector workplaces recognizing unions in 1990 still had them in 1998.  By contrast, the 
proportion of functioning consultative committees to survive over the period was 63 per cent.  
The figure was a little lower for workplace-wide meetings (58 per cent), problem-solving groups 
(56 per cent), and briefing groups (42 per cent).  Overall, therefore, despite its decline, union 
voice and consultative committees would seem to be more durable than direct forms of 
participation. 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Paras 3.3.  3.5.  These paragraphss refer to what we describe as events-driven v.  process-driven 
information and consultation.  Where information and consultation is events-driven, it is 
triggered by a specific, usually employer-initiated, event, such as a reorganization of work or a 
plant closure; where it is process-driven, representation is part of an on-going process in which 
the representative body is more likely to be permanent and to have an agenda which is pro-
active. 
 
Para 3.6.  We agree with your interpretation of the Listing Rules.  Of course, it could be argued 
that the final paragraph implies a disadvantage for, and discrimination against, employees who 
do not have representatives. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Para 4.3.  A key feature of the French comité d’enterprise is that it is chaired by management. 
 
Para 4.4.  German legislation provides for information and consultation for ‘employees of 
individual divisions of the establishment’.  The question of levels is an important one and will 
certainly be a tricky one when it comes to transposition and practice in the UK.  Remember that 
the Directive states that information and consultation shall be ‘at the relevant level of 
management and representation depending on the subject under discussion’.  We take this to 
imply that there should be different levels within an undertaking and that failure to provide for 
this could fall foul of the Directive. 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Para 5.1.  We agree that British law has developed in a ‘piecemeal’ fashion.  As a result the law 
is fragmented and contradictory.  This is an argument for integrating the existing laws.   
 
Para 5.2.  It might be argued at the ECJ that diversity of practice is discriminatory.  Again this is 
an argument for integrating the existing laws.   
 
Para 5.3.  It is proper to point out that ‘legislation must be fully consistent with the new rights 
and responsibilities contained in the Directive’.  We think it is of the utmost importance to stress 
this from the start and to get it right.  It would not be productive to have a repeat of the ‘toing 
and froing’ between the ECJ and the British legislature which occurred with collective 
redundancies and transfer of undertakings.  This would unsettle industrial relations and work 
against any positive outcomes. 
 
Para 5.3.  Reference to ‘support of employees’.  One mechanism to consider might be the 
establishment of some sort of Learning Fund which employee representatives would be able to 
draw on for training. 
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Para 5.8.  On our reading of the Directive, it is only the third item where information and 
consultation must be ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’.  The draft later points out that this 
phrase is also in the collective redundancies legislation.  It has not yet been fully tested in the 
courts.  Our interpretation is that it implies an on-going process of give-and-take and that in a 
legal case employers would have to be able to show evidence that this had indeed taken place. 
 
Para 5.10.  See point above re ‘with a view to reaching an agreement’. 
 
Para 5.12.  Why have two stages of consultation? 
 
 
Annex A 
 
Para 5.  The reference to ‘existing representatives provided their remit and method of 
appointment gives them suitable authority from the employees concerned’ is important.  A weak 
transposition of the Directive which contradicted this provision would lay any legislation open to 
challenge. 
 
Para 6.  Of course, in all the cases, it is good to put in the sanctions.  It will be noted how they 
differ from one another, making the point about the piecemeal and fragmented nature of the 
present law.  It is interesting to speculate as to whether any consolidation could lead to a 
levelling down or levelling up. 
 
Para 10.  However, the obligation is not to inform and consult ‘with a view to reaching an 
agreement’.  Again note the inconsistency. 
 
Para 11.  In cases involving both collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings, it is 
indeed important to note that separate awards may be made in relation to each.  This toughens 
the penalties. 
 
Para 13.  There needs to be another para here on the sanctions under the 1992 Act.  These offer 
yet another procedure, viz arbitration by the CAC which may be incorporated in terms and 
conditions of employment.  Of course, there is an exception to this in the addition in the 1999 
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Act in the case of training.  Here the sanction is the sanction of compensation for the individual 
employee.  Another inconsistency in the law. 
 
Para 15.  Again in the case of health and safety note different procedures. 
 
Para 18.  It is right to mention pensions.  However, this might be the least able to be integrated in 
any consolidation of the law. 
 
Finally, you do not mention Working Time, where again there are obligations to inform and 
consult. 
 
 
Annex B 
 
Para 10.  Is a corollary of this that to comply with an obligation to inform and consult means 
there have to be representatives? 
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Table 1.  The scope of negotiation, information, and information-provision, by type of 
worker representatives, 1998 
 
Issue 
 
Negotiates Consults Informs None 
 
Union representatives 
 
Pay or conditions of employment 38 13 17 32 
Recruitment or selection 3 15 30 52 
Training 5 29 24 42 
Systems of payment 12 16 26 46 
Handling grievances 18 54 13 15 
Staffing or manpower planning 6 33 24 37 
Equal opportunities 7 41 17 35 
Health and safety 13 62 11 14 
Performance appraisals 6 25 16 53 
 
Non-union representatives – workplaces with no recognition 
 
Pay or conditions of employment 16 33 36 15 
Recruitment or selection 2 33 32 33 
Training 3 46 24 27 
Systems of payment 4 20 48 28 
Handling grievances 14 50 16 20 
Staffing or manpower planning 3 36 40 21 
Equal opportunities 10 45 23 22 
Health and safety 18 62 19 1 
Performance appraisals 2 48 19 31 
     
 
Note.  All establishments with 25 or more employees.  The figures for union representatives are weighted and based 
on responses from 923 managers in workplaces with 25 or more employees, union recognition and a union 
representative on site.  The figures for non-union representatives are weighted and based on responses from 134 
managers in workplaces with 25 or more employees and without union recognition, but with non-union 
representative. 
 
Source.  WERS 98.   
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Table 2.  Union presence, density, and recognition, collective bargaining, and joint 
consultative arrangements, 1980 to 1998 
 
 
 1980 1984 1990 1998 
 
Union presence – by workplace 
 
All 73 73 64 54 
Private 
manufacturing 77 67 58 42 
Private services 50 53 46 35 
 
Union density – percentage of employees 
 
All 65 58 47 36 
Private 56 43 36 26 
 
Union recognition – by workplace 
 
All 64 66 53 42 
Private 50 48 38 25 
 
Collective bargaining predominant form of pay determination – by workplace 
 
All  60 42 29 
Private 
manufacturing  50 33 23 
Private services  36 29 14 
 
Consultation – incidence of joint consultative committee – by workplace 
 
All – any 
consultative committee 34 34 29 29 
Private 26 24 18 26 
Union recogntion 37 36 34 30 
No recognition 17 20 17 18 
All – any functioning 
consultative committee 30 31 26 23 
 
Source.  Adapted from Millward et al.  (2000), pp.  85-87, 96, 109, 186-191, 197 
 
 
 27 
Table 3.  Preferences of employees for dealing with workplace issues.  Percentage 
 
 
 
Would you prefer to deal with this 
problem on your own or with…  
 
 
All  
employees 
 
Union  
membership  
status  
 
 
Only 
workplace 
 with union  
presence  
Only  
Workplaces  
with  
recognized  
unions 
Only workplaces 
 with  
WC or JCC 
Both  
WC/JCC  
and union 
presence  
at workplace 
Neither  
WC / JCC  
or union 
presence at 
workplace 
   Member Non-member      
Sexual or racial discrimination at work         
Group of fellow workers 72 78 68 78 78 70 76 63 
Union or staff association rep. 67 84 58 72 77 56 83 54 
         
Negotiating salary         
Group of fellow workers 65 81 56 73 74 60 82 44 
Union or staff association rep. 53 80 38 73 77 38 72 31 
         
Negotiating hours and conditions         
Group of fellow workers 71 81 65 73 75 67 80 62 
Union or staff association rep. 52 76 38 69 73 39 68 34 
         
Promotion issues         
Group of fellow workers 46 50 43 39 37 54 50 38 
Union or staff association rep. 27 36 23 34 35 21 33 20 
         
Workplace bullying         
Group of fellow workers 69 72 68 70 71 74 74 60 
Union or staff association rep. 58 80 46 65 69 46 75 41 
         
Training and skill development         
Group of fellow workers 67 73 65 66 63 73 71 59 
Union or staff association rep. 30 36 26 40 41 28 30 23 
         
 
Note:  Sample was divided at random into t wo variants.  One variant asked if the respondent preferred to solve specific problems on their own or with the help of a group of colleagues or fellow workers.  The other 
variant asked if respondents preferred to solve problems on their own or with the help of a trade union or staff association representative.  Each respondent could only choose either an individual or collective 
solution.  Source: BWRPS (2001) Q35 
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Table 4.  Do you think your workplace would be better with…?  Percentage 
 
 
Do you think your workplace would be 
better with… 
 
 
All  
employees 
 
Union  
membership  
status  
 
 
Only  
workplace 
 with union  
presence  
Only  
Workplaces  
with  
recognized  
unions 
Only workplaces 
 with  
WC or JCC 
Both 
WC/JCC  
and union 
presence  
at workplace 
Neither  
WC / JCC  
or union 
presence at 
workplace 
 
   Member Non-member      
         
Trade Union on its own 7 11 5 14 16 2 9 6 
Works Council on its own 21 6 29 11 10 40 9 27 
Works Council and Trade Union 44 74 27 60 63 24 72 20 
Neither 24 5 34 11 8 31 9 43 
Don't Know 4 3 5 3 3 3 2 4 
         
 
Source: BWRPS (2001), Q51. 
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Table 5.  How well informed do you feel about the following matters?  Percentage 
 
   
 
All  
employees 
 
Union  
membership  
status  
 
 
Only 
workplace 
 with union  
presence  
Only  
Workplaces  
With  
recognized  
unions 
Only workplaces 
 with  
WC or JCC 
Both 
WC/JCC  
and union 
presence  
at workplace 
Neither  
WC / JCC  
or union 
presence at 
workplace 
   Member Non-member      
         
Future employment or staffing plans 
for your workplace 
        
Very / Quite well informed 63 58 65 49 48 72 66 61 
Not very well / not at all  37 42 35 51 52 28 34 39 
         
What other people doing your job are 
earning 
        
Very / Quite well informed 62 71 56 61 64 60 72 52 
Not very well / not at all  38 29 44 39 36 40 28 48 
         
The financial performance of your 
employer 
        
Very / Quite well informed 68 68 67 63 62 75 72 61 
Not very well / not at all  32 32 33 37 38 25 28 39 
         
Your job prospects with your employer        
Very / Quite well informed 75 71 77 63 61 82 78 72 
Not very well / not at all  25 29 23 37 39 18 22 28 
         
The training you need to advance your 
career 
        
Very / Quite well informed 74 76 73 69 69 84 81 63 
Not very well / not at all  26 24 27 31 31 16 19 37 
         
 
Source: BWRPS (2001), Q51 .
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